This provocative but persuasive book is essentially a radical attack upon the Humean conception of causality and the presentation and defense of a counter-theory, closer to everyday experience and pre-Humean traditional views. As formulated by empiricist philosophers, the Humean approach depends on two basic postulates. The philosophical analysis of any non-empirical concept must be a formal explication; any residue elements have to be accounted for in terms of their psychological origins. The world as experienced can be conceived adequately as a (...) logically independent system of things or flux of events, without the unwarranted assumption that individuals persist diachronically. As the grounds for undermining these assumptions, the authors develop a conception of causes as "powerful particulars," i.e., things which have both a nature and powers. So long as the nature remains unchanged the agent in question will continue to behave in this fashion with a natural necessity, stemming from the individual’s nature and specific powers. The opening chapter discusses the problem of conceptual and natural necessity—as distinct from logical necessity which alone is allowed by the Humean empiricists. Natural necessity is the mark of the relationship between real causes and their respective effects, whereas conceptual necessity characterizes the way our statements about such are themselves related. Later the irreducibility of natural necessity is emphasized and its differences from logical entailment spelled out. Chapter two takes up the subject of the "regularity theory and its allies." Characteristic of such are two claims: the empirical content of a causal-relationship statement is exhausted by the actual or hypothetical regularity between independent entities, and the necessity ordinarily attributed to causal production is an illusion, to be accounted for in various ways. Subsequent chapters are devoted to assaulting the pillars of the Humean notion either directly or indirectly through an illuminating and attractive account of their own theory of nature, causal powers, and natural necessity. The final chapter, entitled "Fields of Potential," indulges in speculation about the nature of ultimate entities on the basis of an extended generalization of the notion of the powerful individual, and concludes with a brief account of the historical antecedents of Faraday’s modern field theory and the metaphysical implications of a generalized field theory.—A.B.W. (shrink)

The use of biotechnology in food productiongives rise to consumer concerns. The term ``consumerconcern'' is often used as a container notion. Itincludes concerns about food safety, environmental andanimal welfare consequences of food productionsystems, and intrinsic moral objections againstgenetic modification. In order to create clarity adistinction between three different kinds of consumerconcern is proposed. Consumer concerns can be seen assigns of loss of trust. Maintaining consumer trustasks for governmental action. Towards consumerconcerns, governments seem to have limitedpossibilities for public policy. Under current (...) WTOregulations designed to prevent trade disputes,governments can only limit their policies to 1) safetyregulation based upon sound scientific evidence and 2)the stimulation of a system of product labeling. Ananalysis of trust, however, can show that ifgovernments limit their efforts in this way, they willnot do enough to avoid the types of consumer concernsthat diminish trust. The establishment of a technicalbody for food safety – although perhaps necessary –is in itself not enough, because concerns that relatedirectly to food safety cannot be solved by ``pure''science alone. And labeling can only be a good way totake consumer concerns seriously if these concerns arerelated to consumer autonomy. For consumer concernsthat are linked to ideas about a good society,labeling can only provide a solution if it is seen asan addition to political action rather than as itssubstitution. Labeling can help consumers take uptheir political responsibility. As citizens, consumershave certain reasonable concerns that can justifiableinfluence the market. In a free-market society, theyare, as buyers, co-creators of the market, andsocietal steering is partly done by the market.Therefore, they need the information to co-create thatmarket. The basis of labeling in these cases, however,is not the good life of the individual but thepolitical responsibility people have in their role asparticipants in a free-market. Then, public concernsare taken seriously. Labeling in that case does nottake away the possibilities of reaching politicalgoals, but it adds a possibility. (shrink)

The latest volume in the splendid critical edition of the Opera philosophica et theologica of William of Ockham in progress at the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University under the general editorship of Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. The project itself is something of a phenomenon in the area of critical editions of medieval Latin texts in terms of the rapidity at which quality volumes are produced at remarkably reasonable costs. Since 1967 five quarto volumes, totaling some three thousand four hundred pages, (...) have appeared. Three of these contain the first portion of Ockham’s most important theological work, the Ordinatio of his "commentary" on book 1 of the Sentences. The final portion is scheduled to appear early in 1979 as volume 4 of the Opera theologica. Volume 1 of the philosophical opera contains the monumental Summa Logicae, and volume 3 will also appear this year, thus completing with the present volume the edition of the most important of Ockham’s logical works. Editors are also assigned and are already at work on the other major non-political writings, notably the Quodlibet and commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. Since the Opera politica Guillelmi de Ockham were published in three octavo volumes by the University of Manchester Press, we may expect to have very shortly substantially all the works of the Venerable Inceptor, thanks to the exceptional industry of a team of highly qualified researchers as well as substantial grants by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the De Rance Corporation. Two of the editors of individual works in the present volume are deceased. Father Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., who came to the Franciscan Institute from Germany before the outbreak of World War II, first conceived of and began work on the critical edition. His text of the Tractatus de praedestinatione was first published in 1945 in Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 2 and was subsequently translated into English by M. M. Adams and N. Kretzmann in 1969. It differs little in Brown’s revision, which adds variants from the Bruges MS, unavailable to Boehner because of the war. The other posthumous edition is that of E. A. Moody. This too appeared in the aforesaid Text Series as No. 14. The present text is identical with the earlier version, but observations and suggested alternate readings by the general editor are added in footnotes. The thirty-two pages of introduction contains a wealth of information. To mention but two items: One concerns the probable reason why Ockham only incepted in theology but never served as regent master. This apparently had little or nothing to do with Lutterall’s opposition, as Chancellor of the University, to Ockham’s views and his summons later to the papal court at Avignon. It stemmed rather from the Franciscan custom of promoting those bachelors who had completed their magisterial studies to regent master on the basis of seniority. At his time a junior like Ockham could expect a wait of eight to ten years. It was during this period, beginning probably in 1321 that he began his lectures on logic, probably at the Franciscan house of studies in London where he later composed the Summa Logicae and his exposition of Aristotle’s Physics, before the summer of 1324 when he went to Avignon. Another item is the effective refutation of the authenticity views of Prantl and Anneliese Maier of the Expositiones and their relationship to the spurious and derivative Notabilia. As a final comment, we note that this second volume of the Opera philosophica contains all the works of Ockham edited by Marcus de Benevento under the title Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super artem veterem edita per Ven. Inceptorem Guilielmum de Occham, [[sic]] cum quaestionibus Alberti Parvi de Saxonia.—A.B.W. (shrink)

In September of 1965 G. H. von Wright discovered in Vienna a hitherto unknown notebook written in pencil by Wittgenstein. The first part contains an early, but essentially complete version of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Since it contains the dedication to David H. Pinsent who died May 8, 1918, von Wright dates its composition just before the final composition of the Tractatus in the summer of 1918. This is confirmed by the remaining portion of the manuscript which contains additions and further (...) elucidations to the Prototractatus plus a Preface, all of which are found, virtually unchanged, in the final version of the Tractatus. This edition contains a quite readable facsimile of the entire manuscript, an edition of the text of the Prototractatus that indicates its differences from the final text and a translation en regard by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. A lengthy introduction by von Wright on the publication history of the Tractatus and a concluding set of Tables indicating parallel passages between the Tractatus and Prototractatus as well as those portions of each work which have nothing corresponding in the other, complete the volume. In view of the fact that Wittgenstein on his last visit to Vienna before his death ordered that the several notebooks which still existed from the time of germination of the Tractatus be destroyed, one might ask just what contribution this expensive edition of the Prototractatus may be expected to make to our understanding of Wittgenstein's thought. Unlike the 1914-1916 Notebooks, which by some happy accident escaped the destruct order, the Prototractatus does not seem to differ in any significant substantive way from the final printed version. This is to be expected if von Wright's dating of the work is correct. Hence, while the historian of literature may be delighted with the present text, the student of philosophy may find it disappointing. What does make the present volume of value, however, is von Wright's historical introduction with its reproduction of many of Wittgenstein's letters to various prospective publishers. Of especial interest in this connection is Wittgenstein's illuminating comment to Ludwig von Ficker of Innsbruck, editor of Der Brenner, that "the book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which... will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts; the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book." This would seem to confirm Anscombe's interpretation of Tractatus 6.52 rather than Ayer's and that of the Vienna Circle.--A. B. W. (shrink)

For his contribution to the general series of Harper Essays in Philosophy, Hilary Putnam selects only one of several philosophical problems in the interrelated fields of logic and/or mathematics that have interested him, viz. the nominalism-realism issue: Are the "abstract entities" spoken of in these sciences, such as classes, number, functions from various kinds of things to real numbers, things that "really exist" or not? He is concerned to present a detailed argument for his own "qualified realism" rather than a (...) survey of current opinions. He argues persuasively that while a nominalist would like to eliminate all talk of logical classes such as S, M and P in favor of such circumlocutions as "The following schema turns out to be true no matter what words or phrases of the appropriate kind one may substitute for the letters S, M and P," etc., such descriptions avoid references to classes only by replacing them with equally nonphysical entities such as "all possible words, strings of letters, formalized languages," etc., and that the notion of truth or validity itself cannot be applied to physical objects or material inscriptions, but to what sentences mean or say, and the things they say are not physical. He rejects Quine's distinction that first order statements or arguments such as "All crows are black; all back things absorb light, therefore," etc., are logical truths, whereas "For all classes S, M and P, if all S is M and all M is P, then all S is P," are mathematical. This runs counter, he says, to the whole logical tradition. The natural intention of the logician in setting down first-order schemata is to assert implicitly their validity and that itself is a second-order assertion. All logic, therefore, including quantification theory, involves references to classes. This also highlights the difficulty of distinguishing between logic and mathematics in terms of first and second order logic, for if only the former is stipulated to be the proper domain of logic, then we must accept the awkward consequence that validity and implication turn out to be notions that belong to mathematics rather than logic. Since the nominalistic position presents the same problems for mathematics as for logic, Putnam sees no point in trying to draw any sharp distinction between the two, which explains his initial broad interpretation of logic as including all of pure mathematics and also the title of the book. To avoid some of the classical objections to a realistic interpretation of sets, he points up the distinction between a predicative and impredicative conception of set. Whereas the latter speaks of all sets of individuals as a well-defined totality, the former defines "set" only for a particular language N or a hierarchic series of languages, N, N', N", etc. in which it is still nonsensical to speak of "all sets" without qualification, though one can speak of "all" up to any given level in the series. While some form of set theory is necessary for all the sciences, both formal and physical, one can get along with predicative set theory. Putnam's basic argument for realism then comes down to this. Quantification over mathematical entities such as things, real numbers and functions is indispensable for logic, mathematics and the physical sciences and this commits one to accept the existence of such entities. In the final stages of the argument he examines and rejects the alternative options to realism, namely that realistic locutions about such entities represent logically deviant forms of speech, or that mathematical truths are "true by pure convention" or that such "entities" are useful fictions. In the closing paragraphs he indicates two other philosophical problems in logic that merit extensive discussion, namely the problem of equivalent constructions which is relevant to the question of whether mathematics needs "foundations" and the problem of whether we may not have to revise logical principles as we have geometrical ones on the grounds that in some sense logic may have empirical foundations.--A. B. W. (shrink)

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

Two international congresses within the last five years attest to the current interest in the philosophical and theological thought of John Duns Scotus. Among Scotus' shorter works is the De Primo Principio which is a compendium of his basic metaphysics and natural theology. It has appeared in several modern editions, two with English translations, the latest of which was reviewed in this journal. Prentice's careful and detailed study makes an excellent introduction and commentary on this important but difficult treatise of (...) medieval scholasticism. It is clearly written and while following the general development of the text, it includes helpful cross references to Scotus' other works as well as well as to contemporary literature on controversial points of interpretation. The seventh chapter, devoted to showing something of the human spirit in which the tract was composed, is especially rich in illuminating insights. Medieval scholars will be grateful for this companion volume to the De Primo Principio.--A. B. W. (shrink)

This useful anthology comprises seventy-nine selections arranged under three headings. Part I is titled "Ancient and Classical Ideas of Space"; part II, "The Classical and Ancient Concepts of Time"; part III, "Modern Views of Space and Time and their Anticipations." According to the general editors of the Boston series, R. S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky, Capek’s choice of contents was governed by the desire to show that "parts of our view of nature greatly and mutually influence other parts, and (...) that our conception of the world keeps evolving. Thus, ideas of time intertwine with ideas of space, and both with ideas of matter and force." F. M. Cornford’s essays, "The Invention of Space" and "The Elimination of Time by Parmenides," introduce parts I and II respectively. In part I, while Descartes, Pascal, Gassendi, Newton, etc., speak for themselves, the ancients and medievals are given other mouthpieces—Duhem’s monumental Le système du monde, for Plato, Aristotle, and the medievals; C. Bailey, for Leucippus, Epicurus and Lucretius; Koyré, Höffding, Jammer, for the period from Bradwardine to William Gilbert. On the subject of time, however, both ancient and classical authors are allowed to express their opinions in their own words, with the understandable exception of the Stoics. Part III begins with the prerelativistic critique of Newton as well as the well-known Clarke-Leibniz discussion on the nature of space and time. This third part, however, is dominated largely by the implications of Einstein’s general and special relativity theories. For instance, we have Minkowski’s "Union of Space and Time." Four items, at least, are devoted to the twin-paradox. Some argue for a static, subjective, or even idealistic conception of space-time whereas positivists like Frank attack Sir James Jeans’ and other idealistic interpretations of relativity as instances of meaningless metaphysics. Part III concludes with Weyl’s objectivistic interpretation of quantum-mechanical indeterminacy. While it is difficult to find an anthology that will please all readers or teachers, this work goes far towards dealing comprehensively with the subject of space and time. As Cohen and Wartofsky note, what is distinctive of Capek’s approach within the field of philosophy of nature and its history is that "he is greatly appreciative of Bergson, James, Peirce and Whitehead" and though influenced by them, he is also critical because of the "understanding of the philosophical import that contemporary physics brings into our picture of the world." In a lengthy introduction, the editor explains his rationale for each item he includes. In general this is very helpful, but in some instances the suggested historical connections are misleading at best, if not simply false or questionable. Einstein for instance is said to have "rejected any absolute frame of reference which would be a substrate of absolutely simultaneous events... within the context of Michelson’s vain search for the absolute motion of the earth." This seems to imply—as many others have claimed—that the negative results of the ether-drift experiment influenced Einstein in formulating his relativity theory, whereas historians have pointed out that if Einstein referred to the experiment, it would have to be as a confirmation of his theory, since he did not learn of the results obtained by Michelson and Morley until after the publication of his revolutionary paper in 1905. Though there are other generalizations in the introduction which might be open to dispute, Capek’s prefatory remarks are in general helpful, and the essay collection as a whole stands on its own feet. It is valuable, if for no other reason, that a number of the selections appear in English translation for the first time.—A.B.W. (shrink)

In this book Lewis presents the substance of the first series of Gifford Lectures he gave during the period 1966-1968. In sharp contrast to the prevailing views in Anglo-American philosophical circles, this gifted and prolific writer gives a brilliant and persuasive defense of body-mind dualism. In the first three chapters devoted to Ryle, this clever critic makes the creator of the "category-mistake" look like a paradigm of how to fall into it, particularly in his demythologizing of Descartes, in exorcising the (...) "Ghost-in-the-machine," or in searching vainly for volition as an antecedent act rather than an integral component of every concrete purposeful act. Subsequent chapters treat of Hampshire's "New Materialism," Passmore's "Humpty-Dumpty Argument," Malcolm's "Dreaming," Strawson's refutation of the "no-ownership theory," and so on, Each subsequent opponent such as Hirt, Feigl, Smart, etc. come closer in their monism to fingering the "elusive mind," but fail in the last analysis by confusing circumstantial evidence of its presence with what it is in itself, and thus allow it to dissolve, as it were, into something else. Sydney Shoemaker, in Lewis opinion, comes closest to trapping it when he ties it in with the mind's most personal possessions, its memories, yet even he does not go quite far enough. Finally, in chapter nine. Lewis clarifies the logical character of this "elusive self," which, though never found in a pure state, apart from conscious experience, is recognized both as other than any given experience it may be involved in at the moment, and as being one and the same, not in kind, but individually, in each conscious act. Though each of us directly experiences his own "self," and only his own self, it becomes elusive only when we try to say what its otherness and distinctive character consists in; for all descriptions of it, either in terms of its most intimate experiences such as its memories, or its relationship to present or past events, such as its dispositions, its feelings, its knowledge, or volitions, are all couched in general or universal terms, whereas it is uniquely individual. Hence any attempt to say what it is, to define or describe it, will inevitably confuse it in varying degrees with something other than itself. This explains the apparent success of language philosophers in eliminating it by reductive analysis to something familiar and other that can be described. Subsequent chapters are devoted to explaining how we know "other minds," and how far this conception of the elusive mind is compatible or incompatible with that of other philosophers such as Buber, Bradley, Green, Bosanquet, or the "mystics." A final chapter entitled "The Elusive Self and Morals and Religion" gives a preview of what will be dealt with in a sequel to this work, provisionally entitled "The Elusive Self and God." If it lives up to the present volume, it will indeed be something to look forward to.--A. B. W. (shrink)

Among the quantificational notions neglected by classical logic are "many," "few," and "nearly all." Despite the apparent vagueness associated with these terms in ordinary discourse, in specific contexts we can and do draw strict inferences from statements in which they occur. In this pioneering work, Altham has attempted to uncover something of the formal logic that justifies such inferences. He begins by showing the mutual interdefinability of the three terms. If negation and any one of them are taken as primitive, (...) the other two are definable in terms of these. Selecting as his basic semantic notion the idea of a manifold or many-membered-set, he shows it is only necessary to fix upon a number n, greater than one, to represent the least number of elements to constitute a specific manifold and then one can construct a natural deductive system which uses the standard predicate logic. He develops at great length a weak system that yields principles of inference which are valid in every non-empty domain and in which the classical predicate logic appears as a limiting case. One point that emerges is that the three plurality operators may all be exhibited as involving a double quantification not characteristic of "some," "none," or "all." Next, two stronger systems are developed more briefly which are valid only in many-membered domains. The strongest can represent the largest set of informal arguments and seems to be the most natural of the three. Nevertheless, since these three systems admittedly do not give an exhaustive account of the use of these quantifiers in informal discourse, Altham explains three further systems which correspond more closely to the natural language use of these terms. Finally an appendix indicates what modifications would be required for an intuitionistic logic like Heyting's or the minimal logic of Kolmogorov-Johansson. The text is clearly written and requires no greater logical sophistication to understand than would be needed to follow Lemmon's Beginning Logic or Mates' Elementary Logic.--A. B. W. (shrink)

That "The Classics of Western Spirituality" should regard the man Dante hailed as "beyond the human in contemplation," and St. Bonaventure believed to be the medieval rival of the greatest patristic contemplative worthy of a special volume is not surprising. Richard of St. Victor’s masterful analysis of the ascent of the mind to God in contemplative prayer and meditation, emphasizing the individual’s relationship to other individuals as the paradigm of how the Three Divine Persons are related in their inner life (...) of love, is at the same time of psychological interest for anyone attempting to identify and classify the various mystical states medieval philosophers felt were necessary to characterize their spiritual growth. Since the bulk of the present translation is devoted to Richard’s two major attempts to systematize the discipline needed to attain contemplation, known more generally as Benjamin Minor and Benjamin Major, one might wonder why the work is being reviewed in the present journal. But while the major interest of this volume will undoubtedly be for those interested in ascetic theology, for the influence of Richard on subsequent writers from St. Bonaventure to St. Teresa of Avila is profound, nevertheless the relatively short third portion of the work is of sufficient philosophical importance to merit at least a brief note, namely bk. 3 of The Trinity. One would hardly expect a work of this sort to come from the pen of a mystic, for what Richard sets out to do is nothing short of a purely rational or metaphysical analysis of the "Athanasian Creed," which was recited almost daily by the Canons of the Abbey of St. Victor during the twelfth century. Because the inner nature and life of the Trinity, unlike creation or the salvation history of God’s intervention in the affairs of man, is a necessary consequence of what medieval thinkers believed God to be, rather than what he chose to do, Richard was convinced that with sufficient ingenuity one could theorize fruitfully as to why God must possess the various attributes we believe him to have and which are set forth in the aforesaid "creed," which stresses both the unity of God, the divine nature and all the divine attributes, while continually reminding its confessor of the trinity of "persons." In the Anselmian tradition of "faith seeking understanding" Richard seeks "necessary reasons" why God should not only be one but three. Most medieval thinkers have considered the trinitarian character of the divine nature to be the most profound of all the mysteries of the Christian faith. While reason may at best refute objections to a trinity of persons in one divine nature, it can hardly be expected to provide positive support for the doctrine. Richard, on the contrary, believed that St. Anselm had found the key to the "divine processions" in the fact that God is perfect love, with all that this implies. It is obvious the experience of "love" as an interpersonal sharing of the deepest kind, something St. Paul enjoined upon the Christians of the "Church of Corinth," is a far cry from what Sartre seemed to have reached in writing L'etre et néant or what that term connotes to our age, but it is not unknown to contemporary psychologists. Duns Scotus described the "perfect lover" in a Richardian sense as "Perfecte diligens vult dilectum condiligi!" It is especially in bk. 3 of The Trinity that Richard argues that a personal nature that is "summum bonum" must contain more than one person, and need contain no more than three. For the philosopher of religion interested in Richard’s metaphysical analysis of the Godhead, it would be profitable to preface the reading of Zinn’s fine translation of bk. 3 with the selections from bk. 1.—A.B.W. (shrink)

This monumental work by a perceptive medieval scholar is undoubtedly the most comprehensive work in any modern language of the overall system of Ockham. Its three parts deal respectively with the cognitive order, the theological order, and the created order. Leff credits the more than 30 years of research by such Ockham scholars as Hochstetter, Vignaux, Moody, Baudry, Boehner, etc., with correcting his own earlier misconception—shared by so many historians of philosophy and theology—of Ockham as the one who destroyed scholasticism (...) and upset the fine balance of faith and reason by his ruthless logic, religious insensitivity, and skepticism. Such misconceptions stem from viewing Ockham either through the eyes of his predecessors, such as Aquinas or Scotus, or in the light of "the Ockhamism" of those who claimed to be his followers. In the present book, the author eschews this type of "historical approach." As he puts it, "I have sought to see his thought as a whole, in its own terms, not in pedigrees or... subsequent effects." Although much of Ockham’s writing still await critical editing, Leff sees a remarkable unity in all his works. "They are shaped by the same principles which recur throughout Ockham’s writings.... Whatever the modifications still to come as his works are properly edited, it is inconceivable that they will alter the configuration of Ockham’s thought. It is founded upon the discrepancy between the conceptual and the ontological expressed in the contrast between the individual nature of all being and the universal nature of our concepts. Instead of assuming or attempting to establish a direct rapport between them, Ockham was the first thinker systematically to explore their difference whilst accepting their interdependence." It is precisely because of this interdependence that Ockham was a "conceptualistic realist," to use Boehner’s description. Ockham was "safeguarding concepts from the status of merely mental constructs." He did not deny them epistemological validity as the nominalists did. On the other hand the varying degrees of "realism"—other than conceptualistic—"allowed no means of distinguishing logically between the mental and the real.... The distinction between concepts and what they represented then vanishes, and with it the power of differentiating true from false propositions." Ockham was genuinely concerned with meaning and evidence, the two key words that Leff believes best characterize his outlook. Leff’s professed aim is to show that "Ockham was not a logician devaluing theology or metaphysics; he was no less a philosopher and theologian than his predecessors. He accepted the same framework of knowledge and belief. The difference was that he was concerned with their meaning and evidence to the exclusion of treating their concepts as metaphysical bricks from which to build systems." Howsoever much Leff may have succeeded in achieving this goal or how many of his interpretations of specific topics may need some modification, the fact that he has followed Ockham’s thinking and argument step by step—often in what seems to be little more than an English paraphrase of the Latin text—makes his own detailed analysis a useful instrument for anyone seriously interested in Ockham’s thought.—A.B.W. (shrink)

The present edition of Ockham's seven quodlibets marks the fifth volume of the Opera theologica to appear in the critical edition of his non-political works in progress at the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University, and lives up in every way to the high standards of scholarship that characterized the other seven volumes of his philosophical and theological works that have been published so far. The Quodlibets are among Ockham's most important and mature works. The 170 questions contained here cover (...) almost every major aspect of his thought, and the topics are treated in a clearer, more concise and accurate fashion than in his earlier works. As usual each individual volume of this edition is accompanied by extensive indices. The topical index of some thirty pages makes the present work a particularly valuable research instrument. (shrink)

This may be the most impressive and important single study of Bonaventure’s philosophy that has appeared to date or for many a year to come. Obviously the fruit of many years of painstaking research, this monumental work begins with an 80 page review of characterizations of Bonaventure’s philosophy given by such historians as De Wulf, Mandonnet, Gilson, Patrice Robert, Van Steenberghen, Van der Laan and Ratzinger. Next follows a careful and detailed analysis of the saint’s own teaching about natural knowledge (...) in terms of its foundations, principles and modes, certitude and the role illumination plays in his theological synthesis. This material, used to reveal the historical constitution of Bonaventure’s original and personal philosophy, is organized under nine chapter headings: Composition of Body and Soul in Man; Essence and the Nature of Human Soul; Problem of Plural Forms; Potency of Human Knowledge; Acts and Modes of Human Knowledge; Certitude of Natural Knowledge; Illumination of Natural Knowledge; Order of Reason to Faith in Theology; Problem of Christian Philosophy. Despite the author’s disclaimer that his primary objective is not to settle the historical disputes over the nature of Bonaventures’s philosophy, the general conclusions at which he arrives often differ so markedly from what other’s have said on that subject that he finds it useful to conclude his independent source-study with a 56 page analysis of how far the saint’s own writings support or disprove the opinion of the historians mentioned above. Since it is impossible to even summarize more than a small slice of this detailed study in any informative way, the remainder of the review will concentrate on this concluding portion in view of its more general interest. (shrink)

As the subtitle and consecutive division of contents indicate, these two volumes are integral parts of a single work and one may wonder why they were not published as such since the indices and bibliography in the second volume refers to both works. The basic tripartite thesis of the combined volumes may be stated thus. Both universal properties and universal relationships exist independently of the classifying mind, but not in factual independence of particulars; what universals in fact exist, however, must (...) be determined not a priori by considering what predicates are applied to particulars by linguistic convention, but a posteriori according to the norms of an empiricistic epistemology. Hence, Armstrong calls his theory "a posteriori," or simply, "scientific realism," since it is the task of total science, conceived of as a total inquiry, to determine which monadic or polyadic predicates do correspond to universals and which do not. The first volume is essentially a critical appraisal of classical approaches to the nominalism-realism controversy, whereas the second is a more positive presentation of the author’s own theory and grows out of the prior critique. Thus the second volume can be read independently of the first, especially since a brief recapitulation of the argument of volume one is given at its beginning. Similarly, a brief summary of the argument of volume two is appended to volume one. Thus the two volumes, which apparently grew out of materials presented in independent, but related, seminars, could still be used as such. Only this and the possibility of a student buying the overly expensive work by parts seems to justify the peculiar way in which this set was published. (shrink)

With this work, the author terminates his trilogy on nationally prominent philosophers in Germany, France, and the United States, respectively. In all three works a deliberate attempt is made to counter the current trend towards linguistic analysis and deal with philosophy in its classical meaning as a body of general truths about the universe as a whole, which the author believes leads to some important consequences of present day relevance. The style of the work, to say the least, is unusual (...) in that it is cast in the form of a series of letters, fourteen in number, of a father to his daughter. Since he admits there are no German, French, or American "philosophies," properly speaking, each letter deals with a particular North American philosopher, beginning with Jonathan Edwards, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Paine in Revolutionary days, continuing with Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead as 19th century representatives, and Whitehead, Santayana, and Carnap for the first half of the twentieth. The work concludes with Hans Kelsen and Marcuse, who like Carnap, came to the United States as the result of Hitler’s antisemitism. The tenor of the work lays stress on problems of cultural and political life and, thereby, on the ties of this sort that bind the United States and Europe. The work reads well, and although its tone is more biographical than philosophical, more expository than critical, it could well serve as supplementary reading for a seminar on American philosophy.—A.B.W. (shrink)

Since its origins as a distinct philosophical discipline during the first quarter of the present century, philosophy of science has been largely a matter of logical analysis. Only in relatively recent times have the historically minded philosophers attacked the logical empiricist account of the scientific enterprise. Among the pioneers of this revolution, however, Kuhn, along with Popper and Feyerabend, have also challenged the idea that a linear growth in scientific knowledge is either possible or desirable. Though partial to the historical (...) approach, Wallace will not accept this negativistic thesis. On the other hand, his conviction that most scientists are realists at heart makes him reject the positivistic account of science proposed by Duhem, Mach and the Vienna Circle. Science, he claims, aims at discovering the truth about the world. It is not content simply to describe how things are, but wants to know why. Now it is in their search for causes that scientists reveal their realistic convictions. And it is because science throughout its long history has made causal explanations the paradigm of scientific knowledge that its growth is not the haphazard or irrational sort of thing that Kuhn envisions. In this first of a proposed two-volume work, Wallace traces the origins of this paradigm to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Part I, ‘Medieval Science', sketches the influence of this work on medieval scientists at the universities of Oxford, Paris and Padua from the 13th to the 16th centuries. Part II, entitled ‘Early Classical Science', shows how the earlier paradigm continues to influence such men as Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey and Newton. Both historians and philosophers can profit from this original and controversial study. Even those who would not accept the author’s thesis that "the reconstruction of contemporary philosophy of science necessitates a return to some of the values of medieval and early classical science" will be grateful for the great amount of factual information and wealth of primary source material the book provides. We look forward to the publication of the companion volume on "Classical and Contemporary Science."—A. B. W. (shrink)

Ryle's recent retirement after almost a half-century of study, teaching and writing might well be regarded as the end of an era. A large segment of the philosophical world has come to regard him as the embodiment of the spirit of Oxford. His clear and informal style, his gift for fresh analogies and striking similes, his mastery of the epigram, have set new literary standards for philosophical writing. Largely responsible for inaugurating the B. Phil. and D. Phil. programs after World (...) War II for the benefit of graduate students from abroad, Ryle both as Waynflete professor of metaphysics and editor of Mind has enormously influenced the thinking of Anglo-American philosophers. Apart from his Concept of Mind, Dilemmas and Plato's Progress, his writings have taken the form of reviews, short articles or essays addressed to specific philosophical issues. Though many of these have become minor classics and have graced innumerable anthologies, it is only now that we have virtually the whole of this important segment of his writings available in book form. With the exception of four essays published originally in French, the papers in these two volumes have been published previously in English, mostly in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Analysis or Mind. They range in time from his early days at Oxford to 1968 and cover a wide range of topics, mainly in the areas of philosophical methodology, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mind. Only the fields of moral, political and aesthetic philosophy are comparatively neglected. The first volume contains his critical essays on individual thinkers. They include studies on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as his pieces on such contemporary thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Carnap, Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore and John Anderson, who dominated the Australian scene during the first half of this century. The second volume contains 37 pieces dating back to 1929. It is worth mentioning that despite their brevity, Ryle's introductions to these volumes throw considerable light on his philosophical development. While professional philosophers will be happy to have these collected papers in their present form, we hope they will soon become available in less costly editions for student use.--A. B. W. (shrink)

The present volume is welcome for a dual reason; one that it marks the resumption, after a period of over twenty years, of the scholarly translations of St. Bonaventure, begun under Boehner; the second is the intrinsic value of the translation and lengthy introduction, almost a third of the book. Since the Saint Anthony Guild and Franciscan Herald Presses have published some of the shorter and more popular writings of the saint, it is fitting that the Franciscan Institute, noted for (...) its more technical philosophical and theological studies, should have chosen this series of disputed questions. They are undoubtedly one of Bonaventure's most mature and important writings, stemming from his days as the Franciscan regent master of theology at the University of Paris. The translator has already distinguished himself with a number of other articles and translations of the Seraphic Doctor. His scholarly and informative introduction falls into three chapters, one on the historical background, a second on the originality of Bonaventure's general trinitarian theology, and the third on the specific themes treated in this set of disputed questions. The first throws new light on the origin of the Dionysian and Richardian elements that separate Bonaventure's treatment of the trinity from that of Aquinas. Bonaventure became acquainted with pseudo-Dionysius and Richard of St. Victor through the Summa fratris Alexandri attributed to Alexander of Hales and the early Franciscan Masters at the Paris house of studies. Fontal plenitude, fecundity, and goodness, that figured largely in the Greek Fathers, are developed by Bonaventure in an original and personal way. The incompleteness of the Dionysian model is filled in by Richard's psychological analysis of love and his conception of personhood. Innascibility as the key characteristic of the Father is given a positive twist; it implies one who is first in an absolute sense as the summation of Parmenidean perfection and whose fontal plenitude is not only the source of the dual procession in the Trinity, but spills over into a richly diverse and continuing creation that bears in varying degrees the stamp of its triadic source. Man as microcosm mirrors this most of all, especially that man in whom the Logos, or macrocosm of archetypal ideas, became incarnate. It is only in treatment of the Son and his relationship to creation as exemplar cause that the distinctive influence of Augustine appears. In the final introductory chapter, the specific Trinitarian themes of unity, based on a dynamic rather than a static Aristotelian notion of deity, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability, necessity, and primacy are discussed and what emerges is a deeper appreciation of the synthetic genius of Bonaventure, who drew from such a myriad of sources, yet wove his material into a unique system in which philosophy functions not as a propadeutic to theology, but as an integral and essential part. For that reason the work is of far wider interest than an arcane theological study that only philosophers with a penchant for history might read with profit.--A.B.W. (shrink)

This work represents an attempt to assess the nature and extent of Moore's influence on twentieth century philosophy. The essays it contains were all written in or after 1958, the year of Moore's death, by philosophers whom he knew and respected. As such the writers were often able to highlight certain neglected aspects of his thought as well as ideas he never put in print. Though 10 of the 19 essays have appeared in print before, there are original papers by (...) Ryle, Ewing, William and Martha Kneale, Ayer, Lazerowitz and Urmson as well as somewhat longer studies by Kennick, Greig and Redpath. Together they deal with practically every aspect of Moore's metaphysical and ethical views, his often misunderstood philosophy of common sense, and the special methodology he thought particularly appropriate for investigating philosophical problems. In addition to special treatises on his views on utilitarianism, the naturalistic fallacy, free will, and propositions, the book is introduced with the delightful biographical study Braithwaite did for the Proceedings of the British Academy. The editors see Moore's writings not only as a model of the standard of exactness and refinement of thought one has come to expect of a careful philosopher, but as altering the direction of philosophical investigation. His method of analysis, and especially his ability to translate abstract formulations into concrete meanings, opened the eyes of philosophers to the fuzzy aspects and latent confusions in their own views and arguments. As his former pupils, the editors may be excused for feeling that philosophy after Moore will never be the same as before, but by bringing together this fine selection of essays they have done much to insure his contribution will not be forgotten.--A. B. W. (shrink)

Medieval scholars will welcome these two latest volumes in the splendid critical edition of the nonpolitical works of William of Ockham by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University. The first completes the set of Ockham’s major logical works that began with the publication of his monumental summa logicae in 1974 and was followed in 1978 by the second volume in the philosophical series, containing the commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle’s Praedicamenta and Perihermenias, together with the famous tract on predestination (...) and God’s knowledge of future contingents. Known as the Expositio aurea super artem veterem, this second collection was still available in modern photo-reprints of earlier editions, but the Expositio super libros elenchorum, unlike the popular Summa logicae, was never printed before and this last of Ockham’s commentaries on Aristotle’s logical Organon appears here for the first time in other than manuscript form. Though less important than the other commentaries Ockham did on Aristotle at the Franciscan study house in London during the interim between his completion of the lectures on the Sentences and his summons to the papal court at Avignon in 1324, this work, which antedates his commentaries on the Physics, is not without interest. It illustrates, for instance, how Ockham understood "science" and the subject thereof, to say nothing of the light it throws on how he interpreted the various classical fallacies listed by Aristotle to which he continually refers throughout his other writings. Like the other volumes of this edition, this also contains an excellent analytic index that might well serve as a model for improving other critical editions of medieval works as research tools. (shrink)

In some respects this work represents the culmination of a search Weiss first began in a systematic way some twenty years ago when he set out to investigate reality in terms of what he called "cosmic necessities." This quest resulted in his ontological classic, Modes of Being in which he reduces the necessities to four, Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God. He then circled back, as it were, to study specific areas of philosophic interest in detail, employing his fourfold conceptual scheme (...) to throw light on the God we worship, man and his manifold activities, with special studies on art, sport, cinematics, and finally personhood itself. In the course of this gargantuan enterprise he discovered both the strength and weakness of his original categorial system. The result of this critical reevaluation appeared in two complementary works, Beyond All Appearances and First Considerations. This neo-Weissian view contrasted actuality, as the category of the irreducible, independent, contingent centers of action and value with the five finalities or a priori conditions of intelligibility, namely Substance, Being, Possibility, Existence, and Unity. These are required analytically by the actualities in order that they may have unifying contexts and thus a relational field from which stems their comprehensibility and ultimate value. The self or person is the most important actuality, and Weiss explores the complex interrelationships between persons in terms of the personal pronouns. For those who have followed Weiss's intellectual odyssey, this will undoubtedly be a stimulating book, particularly if it is read in connection with Weiss's seventh volume of Philosophy in Process, in which the thinking processes that led up to the production of the present work are set forth in a more informal and readable fashion, together with a number of tentative drafts of what its contents should be. One of these represents a tour de force of how his expanded categorial scheme might be applied. Another reflection questions the wisdom of trying to apply this scheme too mechanically. (shrink)

This chapter describes the potential far‐reaching consequences of contemplative higher education for the fields of science and medicine.

The use of placebo as a control condition in clinical trials of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders continues to be an area of ethical concern. Typically, opponents of placebo controls argue that they violate the beneficent-based, “best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method” that the original Helsinki Declaration of 1964 famously asserted participants are owed. A more consequentialist, oppositional argument is that participants receiving placebo might suffer enormously by being deprived of their usual medication(s). Nevertheless, recent findings of potential for (...) suicidality in young people treated with antidepressants, along with meta-analyses suggesting that antidepressants add no significant clinical benefit over placebos, warrant a re-evaluation of the arguments against placebo. Furthermore, the nature of placebo treatment in short-term clinical trials is often not well understood, and lack of understanding can foster opposition to it. This paper will show how scientific justifications for placebo use are morally relevant. The fundamental ethical importance of placebo controls is discussed in relation to several aspects of clinical trials, including detection of adverse events, accurate assessment of clinical benefit, advancing understanding of the heterogeneity of depression and anxiety disorders and respecting informed consent requirements. Prohibiting the use of placebo controls is morally concerning in that such prohibitions allow for the possibility of serious adverse public health consequences. Moral worries that research participants receiving placebo are being unduly jeopardised will be shown to be exaggerated, especially in relation to the net benefits for end-users to be gained from the quality of data resulting from using placebo controls. (shrink)

The late John Burrow, one of the most stimulating promoters of the distinctively interdisciplinary enterprise that is Intellectual History, was a vital member of what has become known as the ‘Sussex School’. In exploring the resonances of his singular and richly idiosyncratic contribution, this article places his unique historical sensibility within a series of interpretative contexts, demonstrating the vitality of writings that will continue to inspire and inform scholarship in the field for decades to come. ☆ The Sussex Centre for (...) Intellectual History Lecture delivered at the University of Sussex on 21st October, 2010. I am deeply indebted to Noël Sugimura for reading and commenting on an earlier version of the present essay with her customary sense and sensibility. (shrink)